The concept of faith has remained inscrutable to thinkers for centuries. The late Nathan Rotenstreich believed that faith was such a difficult topic for so many because of its inextricable links to theology and religion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bergson and the Transformations of the Notion of Intuition NATHAN ROTENSTREICH THE CONCEPT "INTUITION",like many other concepts referring to the particular or the singular mode of philosophic cognition, is by no means a univocal concept. In different philosophical systems this concept was given different meanings and directions in accordance with the general trend of the system at stake. We are about to attempt to understand the meaning (...) of the concept of intuition in Bergson's system against the transformations that concept underwent in some major philosophical world-views. Let us observe in the first place: the term 'intuition' derives from the root intu~rL Like several other concepts in the philosophical vocabulary referring to modes of knowledge this term too denotes seeing, a mode of cognition brought about by a direct visual encounter with the world. It belongs to a family of concepts like theoria, speculatio, contemplatio. It is a conjecture that the first use of the term 'intuition' connoting a singular mode of knowledge appears in the mystical literature. The mystic conception stresses the mode of seeing whereby the light is seen; pursuing the Platonic notion, the light of vision makes the very seeing possible. From the mystical literature the concept intuition was absorbed into the philosophical vocabulary.1 Intuition is a mode of knowledge. Yet it conveys a particular ingredient in the sum-total of knowledge, making this mode of knowledge different from other modes. The ingredient conveyed is that of the certainty of the achievement reached by knowledge. From this point of view 'intuition' denotes the position of knowledge in terms of its ultimate consummation, taking consummation as being different from the procedure leading to the final outcome. This component characteristic of 'intuition' is present in Bergson's doctrine, though possibly does not occupy a central place in it. From here we can proceed to the discernment of an additional meaning of 'intuition', a meaning which to some extent seems to be the most common one. 1 Shlomo Pines, translator's Introduction to Maimonides' The Guide oJ the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963),p. Iv. [335] 336 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 'Intuition" is knowledge which takes place directly, without mediation. As such it does not stand in a need of a method, since every method is a way leading to knowledge as well as a wall between the step taken and the final objective of knowledge. A method is essentially a mediation, as a way is a mediation between the point of departure and the destination. Knowledge acquired through a method is thus different from knowledge acquired directly or immediately. We do not confine the notion of method to any particular method, whether experimental or analytic. Any method is reasoning, comparison, verification and a procedure for deriving conclusions. Against these aspects of method intuition is presented precisely as seeing. Seeing is that visual encounter with objects which does not take on a methodical character. It might be preceded by methodological knowledge, but the act of seeing per se is trans-methodical. A close reading of Bergson's text will show that this aspect of intuition again is present in his doctrine, but it is by far not the most prominent aspect of his own rendering of intuition. It can be said in a general way that in different philosophical systems we find a kind of a conjunction of the first meaning of 'intuition' in terms of certainty with the second meaning in terms of directness. Different philosophers in different contexts maintained the view that the unqualified certainty of knowledge can refer only to the ultimate stratum of reality or to God, and that this stratum or God can be known directly. Plato's view (to look to the absolute and eternal) could be a paradigm of this trend. 2 This view re-emerges in Spinoza. The mode of knowledge which is the highest and most certain achievement on the ladder of modes of knowledge, as Spinoza puts it, is true and necessary: "He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived." 3 This mode of knowledge is adequate to its... (shrink)

Let us start with a short description of the phenomenon of will, and in this we shall naturally take advantage of Aristotle’s analysis. Let us say in the first place that will has two basic features. It is a factor or an actor bringing about effects. As such, it is a factor inside the agent, moving the agent, giving momentum to his attitudes or approaches, as well as giving direction to his attitudes and their manifestation in action. Will also connotes (...) a choice and, thus, is close to a decision focusing on a certain course or objective. The actions or the deeds are in this sense a manifestation of will as both a driving force and a choice or decision. From the point of view of the manifest action, will is closer to being a disposition, not in the passive sense, but one which is an active attitude. In so far as objectives of action or will are concerned, the question arises—and as we shall see, this is the crux of the controversy—whether objectives are only pursued or whether they are also set and posited. There is the additional question whether will is spontaneous, that is to say, is its own source; or whether, as an activity directed towards an objective, it in turn is motivated, bewaring from the pitfall of an infinite regression. (shrink)

Kant’s reference, a critical one at that, to Edmund Burke is a well-known paragraph in the General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments, which follows paragraph 29 of The Critique of Judgment. Kant calls Burke’s exposition physiological since, according to Burke, the feeling of the sublime is grounded on the impulse towards self-preservation and on fear. Concomitantly, the beautiful according to Burke is grounded on love which, in turn, is reduced to the relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the (...) fibers of the body. Kant believes that as psychological observations these analyses of our mental phenomena are extremely fine. But he takes exception to them by stressing that any reliance on psychological data rests ultimately upon the immediate feeling of personal well-being or on personal feelings in general. Against this, which he calls egoistic validity, a pluralistic validity is called for. Laws of that character yield a knowledge not only of how we do judge, but they give us a command as to how we ought to judge. What is lacking in Burke, Kant concludes, is a transcendental examination. (shrink)

1. The relationship established between God and possibility on the one hand and the aspect of realization on the other is, in a way, an explication of the Aristotelian position. Though Professor Weiss does not proceed along strict Aristotelian lines--in view of the fact that he does not put forth the doctrine that realization has to precede possibility--he still holds an Aristotelian view in the sense that for him possibility has no self-sufficient, independent ontological status, but must find its supplement (...) and complement in reality--in this context, in God. (shrink)

Hegel rejected this view. The laws of phenomena constitute a general copy of the phenomena themselves. This copy lacks the internal relation of the phenomena's schema and, being their Abbild, it follows the phenomena. For Hegel the subject-matter of philosophy is the whole, and he could not, therefore, confine the character of philosophy to the exploration of legislation which applies to data or which is only a form replacing empirical data. Being a cognition of fullness, philosophy is also the self-reflection (...) of the Idea which in turn is identical with being. Here Hegel follows in the footsteps of Aristotle. Once he elaborates the subject-matter of philosophy, Hegel also elaborates what we may call the philosophy of philosophy, that is, the delineation of philosophical thinking as against any other activity of the mind including science, art, religion. Hegel's substantive notions of philosophy are imbued with his conceptions of the nature of philosophy, and these two aspects of his system are closely interrelated. (shrink)

This is a systematic philosophy of politics and the state. As few contemporary books do, Order and Might provides a general theory, exploring the structure of socio-political experience.

There is a common distinction between two aspects of history: history as the object dealt with and history as the way of dealing with the object. Within the “objective” aspect of history one may distinguish between the attempt to define the object as man and the attempt to define it as process. Within the “subjective” aspect there is the prevailing tendency to put forward the nature of the onceptual method as one employing individual concepts.

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE FREEDOM, ACTION AND DEEDS It is an established fact that Kant's theory of deeds or acts can ultimately be equaled with his ethical theory. ...

Aus dem Inhalt I. Unity and Hierarchy II. Beyond Unity towards Totality III. Cognition and Action IV. On some Transformations of the Concept of Ideal V. Ethics instead of the Dogmatic Dress VI. From Religion to Speculation VII. Religion and its Misplacement VIII. Will and Social Contract IX. Architectonics and Edifice Print-on-Demand-Nachdruck der Ausgabe von 1984.

DELIBERATE KNOWLEDGE I. EXPLICATION Human beings habitually have knowledge of a great variety of things. How can we describe the situation in which ...

This book analyses the systematic differences between Kant's system and that of Hegel. The relation between the two systems can be described as one of a dialectical character. Hegel continues to explicate some of the basic concepts of Kant's system and mainly the concept of reason, but he does this by way of 'Aufhebung'. The concepts are present but, because of the trend from duality to integration, they undergo basic changes in their meaning and direction. The relation between reason and (...) ethics is, from this angle, the axis of this book. (shrink)

Discusses the encounter between German philosophy and Judaism in the 18th-19th centuries, focusing on the Hegelian and Kantian systems, and analyzes their negative evaluation of Judaism. Explores also the views of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and Jewish responses.

It seems that the distinction goes even further. The philosophical historians look at the sum total of occurrences in time as exemplifying an underlying absolute substance in the Hegelian sense, or a basic human activity like economic production as an autonomous creation of human life. Against this view of history, Weiss takes the position that history has to be understood first through universal ontological distinctions. Whatever is characteristic of being in general is characteristic of history. Thus history is not looked (...) at from the point of view of a basic content, or as carried by a basic act; history is integrated into the universal structure of the world, and whatever pertains to the universe at large pertains to history. (shrink)

Another version of this theory, which is based on both naturalistic and psychological premisses, states that the specific characteristic of the self consists in reflected appraisals. According to this view, the adult's appraisal of the child is reflected in, and is eventually the source of, its self-appraisal. In other words, self-consciousness is engendered by the social-cultural environment. It is worthwhile to note that the term "reflected appraisals" is ambiguous, and intentionally employed as such, for "to reflect" means both "to mirror" (...) and "to be self-conscious." This version of the genetic approach is also open to question, for it fails to explain how culture, i.e., personal interrelationships, or more precisely the relations between the child and the adult environment, miraculously intervenes in the course of the organism, creating in it a new dimension, that of the Ego. For this intervention is not a simple one. In order to enable the creation of consciousness as a reflected appraisal, the Ego must first acknowledge the existence and bearing of the adult environment, the estimation of which is valuable, worthy of being reflected in, and the consequent source of a newly created self. Is the child aware of the estimation of those estimating it? Is this awareness itself derived from the adult environment and its appraisal? If not, there can be no appraisal of the environment in the absence of an evaluative activity on the part of the child. It follows that only on the basis of evaluating the adult environment can the child identify himself with its appraisal of him. In other words, the genesis of consciousness cannot possibly be traced to external appraisals, for awareness and consequent reflection of appraisal presupposes consciousness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Common Sense and Theological 9 9 Exper_,ence on the Bas s o,f Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy NATHAN ROTENSTREICH The position of Franz Rosenzweig's thinking within the framework of presentday philosophy is difficult to ascertain. Though he was deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, his chief work, The Star o] Redemption (Der Stern der Erlgsung, 1921), was conceived outside the main discussions of the philosophical controversy in the twenties. (...) He formulated his ideas side by side with the trends of German philosophy, but not by way of keeping pace with these trends. Yet his polemic against traditional philosophy in general, and against idealism in particular brings Rosenzweig close to the character of the rebellion represented by Existenz-Philosophie. 1 I The question of grounding a philosophical system or a set of philosophical ideas with an objective toward faith clearly poses the difficulty, in terms of the ultimate authority, of maintaining the validity of such a system of ideas. Could that authority be reason, which as a source of ideas and confirmation is outside faith while having consequences or expressions within the scope of faith? Or is faith, asserting the existence of God and his relations to world and man, an independent source? In case faith is an independent source, does it have the guarantee of its validity in its own boundaries, or does it still point to a source of validity which is outside faith and yet is not reason? It seems that Franz Rosenzweig was willy-nilly in his concern with this question. As said before the first approach would have been to construct a system along rational lines. This, however, would have done violence to a basic anti-rationalistic trait in Rosenzweig's thinking that can be clearly discerned in his The Star o] Redemption, in his Kleinere Schri]ten and in his small book, Understanding the Sick and Healthy, published until now in English only. Rosenzweig's criticism of rationalism may be summed up as follows: a) Reason strives for a unified conception of the world; and in support of this monistic fiction its assimilative energy is ready to seize upon all arguments that militate against the doctrines and practices of faith. b) Reason tends to ignore the existence of the individual which it regards as 1On the relation between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger, see Karl LSwith, "M. Heideggerand F. Rosenzweigor Temporality and Eternity," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,III (Sept., 1942),53-77. [353] 354 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY merely one of the variations of an all-inclusive unity. The question of the relation of the particular to the general or of the individual to the whole, which has engrossed philosophers since time immemorial, has no place in rationalistic systems. c) Since reason places the understanding above the things to be understood (and hence also above the data of religious experience, including the existence of God), we find that from a speculative and historical point of view rationalism has a strong bias against religion or theology. The other way open to Rosenzweig was to rely on the principle of Revelation, but he could not adopt this principle as the basis of his system for the following reasons" a) The first reason can be understood from Schelling's paradox: He who adheres to Revelation does not philosophize, and he who philosophizes finds Revelation inadequate for his purposes. Since Rosenzweig was basically a philosopher --despite his protestations to the contrary--he was precluded by that very fact from appealing to the evidence furnished by Revelation. On the contrary, he sought to find a non-rational basis for Revelation itself. b) The second reason that precluded Rosenzweig from taking the traditional course of relying on Revelation is implicit in that principle itself as Rosenzweig understood it. Revelation in his system has no enlightening or cognitive significance, or what is called in Christian theology Kerygma, instructive knowledge. In Revelation, he says, God reveals only revelation; He reveals himself to man and to man alone.2 In his view, then, Revelation does not transmit informative content and hence has no dogmatic significance. It is a dialogue that posits the existence of the participants, the existence of God, and (highly important for... (shrink)

The main feature of any type of dialectic seems to be a drive for totalities or wholes, that is to say, a drive towards a synoptic view. This might be realized in various forms, either in systems of thought or in systems embracing both thought and being. The well known formal features of dialectic, that is to say, the contradiction of concepts, is but an indication that the inner movement--as Hegel put it--of concepts in their development toward the establishment or (...) manifestation of the whole takes place through and because of concepts. (shrink)

Confidence or trust is obviously a sort of reliance or dependence. Confidence is related to fiducia , which in turn is related to fido and to the Greek peitho . The latter term implies persuasion or persuasiveness. If we follow, as we should, the nuances hidden in these terms, we may assume that confidence is a reliance stemming from persuasion or accompanied by it. Confidence may be related to a person, including oneself, and in this sense we speak of self-confidence; (...) or it may be related to another person, either in the singular or in the plural, or even perhaps to the course of events at large, to history, to the cosmos, to God etc. It is in this sense that confidence is the opposite of or contradictory to fear. And Aristotle indeed placed the brave man between the two poles of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. (shrink)